686People who are cognitively busy are also more likely to make selfish choices, use sexist language, and make superficial judgment in social situations, et seq.
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687Baumeister's group has repeatedly found that an effort of will or self-control is tiring; if you had had to force yourself to do something you are less willing or less able to exert self-control when the next challenge comes around. The phenomenon has been named Ego Depletion.
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688Unlike cognitive load, ego depletion is at least in part a loss of motivation. After exerting self-control in one task, you do not feel like making an effort in another, although you could do it if you really had to. In several experiments, people were able to resist the efforts of ego depletion when given a strong incentive to. In contrast, increasing effort is not an option when you must keep 6 digits in short-term memory while performing a task. Ego depletion is not the same mental state as cognitive busyness.
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689The nervous system consumes more glucose than most other parts of the body, and effortful mental activity appears to be especially expensive in the consuming of glucose.
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690The bold implication of this idea is that the effects of ego depletion could be undone by ingesting glucose, and Baumeister and his colleagues have confirmed this hypothesis in several experiments.
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691Associate activation: Ideas that have been evoked trigger many other ideas, in a speeding cascade of activity in your brain. The essential feature of this complex set of mental events is coherence. Each element is connected, and each supports and strengthens the others.
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692Your subjective experience is the story that your system 2 tells itself about what is going on. Primary phenomena arise in system 1, and you have no conscious access to them.
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693The experience of familiarity has a simple but powerful quality of "pastness" that seems to indicate that it is a direct reflection of prior experience. This quality of pastness is an illusion.
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694A reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because familiarity is not easily distinguishable from truth. Authoritarian institutions and marketers have always known this fact.
People who were repeatedly exposed to the phrase "the body temperature of a chicken" were more likely to accept as true the statement "the body temperature of a chicken is 144 degrees" (or any other arbitrary number).
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695If possible, the recipients of your message want to stay away from anything that reminds them of effort, including a source with a complicated name.
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696Cognitive strain, whatever its source, involves system 2, which is more likely to reject intuitive answers.
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697And yet, as we saw in Figure 5, Repetition induces a cognitive ease and a comforting feeling of familiarity. Et seq.
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698Mood evidently affects the operation of system 1: when we are uncomfortable and unhappy, we lose touch with our intuition.
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699Jumping to conclusions is efficient if the conclusions are likely to be correct and the costs of an occasional mistake acceptable, and if the jump saves much time and effort.
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700When system 2 is otherwise engaged, we will believe almost anything. System 1 is gullible and biased to beliee, system 2 is in charge of doubting and unbelieving, but system 2 is sometimes busy, and often lazy.
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701The Halo Effect: The tendency to like (or dislike) everything about a person.
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702The sequence in which we observe characteristics of a person is often determined by chance. Sequence matters, however, because the halo effect increases the weight of first impressions, sometimes to the point that subsequent information is mostly wasted.
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703James Surowiecki: The wisdom of crowds
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704The combination of a coherence-seeking system 1 with a lazy system 2 implies that system 2 will endorse many intuitive beliefs, which closely reflect the impressions generated by system 1. Of course, system 2 also is capable of a more systematic and careful approach to endorse (?) and if following a list of boxes that must be checked before making a decision. Think of buying a house, when you deliberately seek information that you don't have. However, system 1 is expected to influence even the more careful decisions. Its input never ceases
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705WYSIATI (What you see is all that is) facilitates the achievement of coherence and of the cognitive ease that causes us to accept a statement as true. It explains why we can think fast, and how we are able to make sense of partial information in a complex world much of the time. The coherent story we put together is close enough to reality to support reasonable action. However, I will also invoke WYSIATI to help explain a long and diverse list of biases of judgment and choice, including the following among many others: et seq.
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706Basic assessment and how people vote.
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707A remarkable aspect of your neural (?) life is that you are rarely stupid. See substituting questions, same page.
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708System 1 is not prone to doubt. It suppresses ambiguity and spontaneously constructs stories that are as coherent as possible.
Mozart?
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709We defined the Availability Heuristic as the process of judging a frequency by "the ease with which instances come to mind."
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710A professor at UCLA found an ingenious way to exploit the availability bias. He asked different groups of students to list ways to improve the course, and he varied the required number of improvements. As expected, the students who listed more ways to improve the course rated it higher.
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711The question about probability (likelihood) was difficult, but the question about similarity was easier, and it was answered instead. This is a serious mistake, because judgments of similarity and probability are not constrained by the same logical rules.
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712Statistical base rates are generally under weighted, and sometimes neglected altogether, when specific information about the case at hand is available.
Causal base rates are treated as information about the individual cause and are easily combined with other case-specific information.
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713Subjects willingness to deduce the particular from the general was matched only by their willingness to infer the general from the particular.
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714Success = Talent + Luck
Great success = a little more talent + a LOT of luck.
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715Our mind is strongly biased toward causal explanations and does not deal well with "mere statutes(?)"
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716The halo effect helps keep explanatory narratives simple and coherent by exaggerating the consistency of evaluations: Good people do only good things and bad people are all bad.
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717The human mind does not do well with movements.(?)
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718Why are experts inferior to algorithms? One reason is that experts try to be clever, think outside the box, and consider complex conditions of features in making their predictions. Et seq.
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719Experienced radiologists who evaluated chest x-rays as "normal" or "abnormal" contradict themselves 20% of the time when they see the same picture on separate occasions. A study of 101 independent audits revealed a similar degree of inconsistency. A review of 41 separate studies of the reliability of judgments made by auditors, pathologists, psychologists, organizational (?), and other professionals suggest that this level of inconsistency is typical even after a case is reevaluated within a few minutes. Unreliable judgments cannot be valid predictors of anything.
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720Atul Gawande's A Checklist Manifesto
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721Emotional learning may be quick, but what we consider as "expertise" usually takes a long time to develop. The acquisition of expertise in complex tasks such as high-level chess, professional basketball, or firefighting is intricate and slow because expertise in a domain is not a single skill but rather a large collection of miniskills.
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722The confidence that people have in their intuitions is not a reliable guide to their validity.
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723If subjective confidence is not to be trusted, how can we evaluate the probably validity of an intuitive judgment? When do judgements reflect their expertise? When do they display an illusion of validity? The answer comes from two basic conditions for acquiring a skill:
-An environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable.
-An opportunity to learn these regulations through prolonged practice.
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724Some environments are worse than irregular. Robert Hogarth described wicked environments in which professionals are likelyto learn the wrong lesson from experience.
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725Intuition cannot be trusted in the absence of stable regulations (?) in the environment.
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726People become risk-seeking when all their options are bad.
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727Losses evoke stronger negative feelings than costs. Choices are not reality-bound because system 1 is not reality-bound.
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728Nudge examples
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729Peak-end rule: The global retrospective rating was well predicted by the average of the level of pain repeated at the worst moment of the expense and at its end.
Duration neglect, the duration of the procedure had no effect whatsoever on the ratings of total pain.
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730The experimenting self is the one that answers the question "Does it hurt now?" The remembering self is the one that answers the question "How was it, on the whole?"
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731Focusing illusion: Nothing in life is as important as you think it is when you are thinking about it.
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732Choice Architecture
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733Presentation greatly matters: if for example, a potential outcome is focused as a loss, it may have more input than if it is presented as a gain.
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